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This essay focuses on a range of formal and informal practices that I
hypothesize as the making of new types of jurisdictions with variable
relations to the traditional jurisdiction of the state over its territory. One
effect is to contribute to an emergent misalignment between territory and
territoriality. A second effect is to make structural holes in the tissue of
national state sovereign territory. Both processes contribute new types of
borderings inside national territory. The action is not on interstate
borders, but in the interior of the state, which can mean an extension of
one state into another's territorial jurisdiction or into the high seas, a
zone where no state has exclusive jurisdiction. I also explore whether
these formations are hidden from the formal eye of the state by the
contractualizing of governmental authority.
INTRODUCTION
There is much that can be rendered invisible in complex systems,
intentionally or unintentionally. The instruments, intentions, and
accidental outcomes leading to or generating this invisibility vary
enormously across different epochs and their particular formalized
systems. Further, what may remain invisible, even though present and
consequential, in one type of formalized system, can be highly present in
another but be less significant. In this essay I will explore such
interactions between visible formalizations and invisible facticities; I
use the concept of facticities to capture conditions that have the
* Saskia Sassen is the Robert S. Lynd Professor of Sociology and Co-Chair, The
Committee on Global Thought, Columbia University (www.saskiasassen.com). Her recent
books include: TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES
(2008) and DIGITAL FORMATIONS: IT AND NEW ARCHITECTURES IN THE GLOBAL REALM
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properties of facts but may not quite be facts because they belong to
complex systems not easily reduced to the empirical.' I engage these
questions by focusing on one particular formalized system, the state's
sovereign authority over its national territory.
Partly due to globalization and its destabilizing of national borders,
we can now detect particular formations that may long have been there
in less developed condition or merely incipient-some inherited from
earlier epochs, and some new. Formally, they are not legible through
national state law. At least in some cases, they are unrecognized but
functioning operational spaces. We can conceive of these formations as
an ironic version of the terra nullius of an older era, when what could
not be mapped because it was unknown was represented as a terra
nullius.2 In a way, we are now entering a post-mapped era, one that has
gone beyond the interstate system as formally mapped. Even if today, as
in the past, this system is continuously being mapped, I argue that this
is more an aspiration to precise mapping. In contrast, the mapping
project of centuries past was all encompassing--early explorers
"discovering" the world and emergent states fighting for ownership both
of meters of terrain and vast overseas colonies.
I. EMERGENT INFORMAL JURISDICTIONS
The current "mapped" era helps make visible the emergence of new
spaces, so new that they are still a kind of terra nullius in the formal
interstate system. These new spaces arise partly due to the incipient,
often partial but punctual, disassembling of that older interstate system
with its unitary formations, the nation-states of the twentieth century.
This process cannot be confined to a remapping of interstate borders. It
entails an internal disassembling of nation-states, and is less visible to
the eye of the law than would a change to an interstate border.
Diverse facticities are making these emergent disassemblings
visible. Some of these are new; others are old, but long invisible to the
interstate system. For instance, recognition of the need to protect the
habitats of fisheries has generated new types of emergent jurisdictions
1. SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL
ASSEMBLAGES 378-423 (2d ed. 2008).
2. Terra Nullius is a term derived from Roman Law that is used in international law
to describe territory that does not fall under any sovereign authority, or is not claimed by
any sovereign. See Tim Rowse, Terra Nullius, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AUSTRALIAN
HISTORY 643 (Graeme Davison, John Hirst & Stuart Macintyre eds., 2001). The U.S.
Supreme Court has had cases where this term is used. See, e.g., State of New Jersey v.
State of New York, 523 U.S. 767, 788 (1922).
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that can be in conflict with older jurisdictions. 3 Thus, when such a
habitat cuts across interstate borders, it can lead to considerable legal
debates if, for instance, there is an international law that protects
fisheries, and either overrides or enters in competition with older
interstate law. The long-term fisheries dispute between the United
States and Canada would then acquire a new element, a sort of third
party's interest-the protection of the natural habitat of fisheries that
cut across national borders. 4 A very different and highly instrumental
case is the use of the "high seas" as an operational space to stop refugee
entries and avoid non-refoulement rules; this has become common
practice among European national state agencies seeking to prevent
entries by refugees from Africa across the Mediterranean Sea.
These very diverse formations-fisheries and the "high seas"-have
existed for centuries, but they were either largely invisible to the formal
eye of national state and interstate law (fisheries), or were developed
and used for different purposes (the "high seas" in earlier periods).
Specific assemblages of meaning-the environmental question and the
fear of immigration-have had the power to bring them to the fore, and
to make them the source of much legal ambiguity and conflict. They are
intersections where different or new systems of rules generate new
types of interpretation difficulties. Another such instance is privatizing
governance through its contractualizing where this might once have
been inconceivable, including transnationally. 5 Notable examples of the
current period are governing immigration through private contracts
rather than state law.
In what follows I briefly conceptualize these diverse tensions and
then examine several pertinent cases. I give particular attention to the
large-scale acquisition of land by foreign government agencies and
firms, an old process that expanded sharply after 2006 and reached over
200 million hectares by 2011, only five years later.6 One substantive
3. Here are three articles, from a symposium in the MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, on natural resources and international law which address the issue
of fisheries and jurisdiction. See generally Eric A. Bilsky, Conserving Marine Wildlife
Through World Trade Law, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 599 (2009); John A. Duff,
Assemblage-Oriented Ocean Resource Management: How the Marine Environment Washes
over Traditional Territorial, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 643 (2009); Ted L. McDorman, Canada-
United States Cooperative Approaches to Shared Marine Fishery Resources: Territorial
Subversion, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 665 (2009).
4. See Rowse, supra note 2 (discussing the term terra nullius).
5. See generally Peer Zumbansen, Introduction: Private Ordering in a Globalizing
World: Still Searching for the Basis of Contract, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 181
(2007).
6. See WARD ANSEEUW, LIZ ALDEN WILY, LORENZO COTULA & MICHAEL TAYLOR, INT'L
LAND COALITION, LAND RIGHTS AND THE RUSH FOR LAND: FINDING OF THE GLOBAL
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rationale for this focus is that it brings to the fore a tension between (a)
the fact that interstate borders matter less today for many international
flows and (b) the fact that this focus on open borders may be obscuring
the new types of borderings and informal jurisdictions taking shape
inside national territory. Elsewhere, 7 I posit that these developments
contribute to constitute a multi-sited global space of a different sort
from that of the self-evident global scale, which has received most of the
attention. The former may well be as significant a transformation of our
global age as is that global scaling and the weakening of most interstate
borders; after all, interstate borders have long been crossed, lawfully or
not, and imperial geographies have been part of the making of
nation-states.8
These diverse developments, and others not discussed here,
contribute to an emergent misalignment between territory and
territoriality. While these two terms were never perfectly symmetric-
with abundant instances of acute misalignment through colonialism and
post-coloniality-it is nonetheless the case that the twentieth century
saw the strengthening of alignment between territory and territoriality.
But the past .two decades have once again brought about more
misalignments, some recognized and some not. The concern here is to
detect holes in the tissue of national state sovereignty as traditionally
constructed over the last century, the period that saw the rise of the
capable, often powerful, administrative state, and as formalized in law.9
II. STRUCTURAL HOLES IN THE TISSUE OF NATIONAL STATE AUTHORITY
There are two features that matter to this analysis, both of which I
have emphasized in my prior work.'0 First, sovereignty has been partly
disassembled formally over the last twenty to thirty years, depending on
the country. While much is still formally included in the national state
and sited in national state territoriality, some of it has shifted to other
institutional spaces, including global institutions such as the World
Trade Organization (WTO), and private orderings that have taken over
COMMERCIAL PRESSURES ON LAND RESEARCH PROJECT 4 (Tim Bending & David Wilson
eds., 2011) (It.).
7. SASKIA SASSEN, UNGOVERNED TERRITORIES (forthcoming 2013).
8. I develop this argument at length in Chapter 3 of TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS:
FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES. SASSEN, supra note 1.
9. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA (1992); Alfred C.
Aman, Jr., A Global Perspective on Current Regulatory Reform: Rejection, Relocation, or
Reinvention?, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 429 (1995) [hereinafter A Global Perspective
on Current Regulatory Reform].
10. See SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION
1-32 (1996); SASSEN, supra note 1, at 148-276.
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what was once under the aegis of international law. Besides the
International Criminal Court (ICC) and the WTO, both public
formalized domains that stand out, there is growing transnational
contract law known as "contract governance." Peer Zumbansen writes
that this is of rising interest for legal scholars due to the "increasing
de-legalization and technicization of contract on the one hand and the
proliferation of contractual governance in almost all sectors of societal
life on the other."'"
What is of particular interest to the argument in this paper is that
once the shift to the private sphere has happened, the fact that these
were components of state sovereignty is easily rendered invisible. My
concern is not normative, but operational: how a system can render
invisible its original aims and intentions and can alter the valence of a
systemic capability. 12 Past origins and performance are re-coded as
elements of global "normative" orderings, dealing with global capitalism
(WTO law, International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality,
international accounting standards, and many others) or with the global
commons, from human rights to the environment (far fewer, but we can
single out the ICC).13 Many contribute to strengthen the legitimacy of
private orderings, upheld as the proper way to do things-an extension
of the legitimacy of the private sphere and of the norm that wherever
possible we should have markets rather than governments enabling the
work that needs to be done. Sovereignty remains a key systemic
property, but its institutional bases are diversifying beyond the national
11. Zumbansen, supra note 5, at 185. Another author that has worked extensively on
privatization is Katharina Pistor. An informal circuit is also emerging in these private
governance initiatives. Lori Nessel writes on "medical repatriation," which is the
extrajudicial deportation of seriously ill migrant workers directly by hospitals. Rather
than writing about this as an anomalous or exceptional occurrence, Nessel formulates this
as a predictable outcome of the global undocumented labor market and the progressive
privatization of immigration enforcement. See Lori A. Nessel, Disposable Workers:
Applying a Human Rights Framework to Analyze Duties Owed to Seriously Injured or Ill
Migrants, 19 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 61 (2012).
12. See SASSEN, supra note 1, at 1-24, 401-24.
13. Transnational NGOs have emerged as significant actors in some of these domains.
Sarah Phillips examines the ability of transnational NGOs to empower localized
populations that are powerless by linking their appeals for rights at the national level to
transnational human rights movements, using the case of disability rights in the Ukraine.
See Sarah D. Phillips, Civil Society and Disability Rights in Post-Soviet Ukraine: NGOs
and Prospects for Change, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 275 (2009). Joshua Reading
looks at the privatization of healthcare in the global South as global NGOs and
international relief agencies take over vital services once provided by the state. See
Joshua P. Reading, Who's Responsible for This? The Globalization of Healthcare in
Developing Countries, 17 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 367 (2010).
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state. This diversifying is mostly invisible insofar as it shifts
components of sovereignty to nonstate domains.
Secondly, even as globalization has expanded, state authority over
its territory remains a key ordering in the international system.14 But, I
argue,15 it does so with one difference; it now feeds, above all, the power
of the executive branch of government, a power that has become
increasingly privatized. Some components of the state's territorial
authority, especially the regulatory and oversight responsibilities of the
legislature, shift to other institutional homes, notably the market
(privatization) and to an emergent jurisdiction of global regulators. 16
Here I build on both of these earlier propositions, but the focus is
different. I examine what is formally hidden by the ongoing dominance
of territorial state authority, on the one hand, and by the growing
contractualizing of governmental authority, on the other. The first
conceptual move is to identify structural holes in the tissue of what we
might describe as the formal (versus de facto) authority of the state.
Another way of describing it is that the cages of national statehood are
breaking, and that in a few instances this breakage becomes formally
visible (e.g WTO law and ICC law) and in some other instances this
visibility is material or derives from inference (e.g. the implications of
large-scale land acquisitions by foreign government agencies and firms
for a state's territorial authority). But in most cases the breakage is
invisible to the eye of the law.
To capture the meaning and import of these developments, I posit
that they can be conceived of as the making of informal jurisdictions.
What I seek to capture either escapes established jurisdictions or worms
itself into them and can easily be confused with them.17 I also think of
14. An important issue for my analysis is the ongoing transformation of territoriality
as a system of authority. Historically, Hannah Buxbaum notes that territoriality "referred
to the exclusive authority of a state to regulate events occurring within its borders ... Over
the course of the twentieth century, the concept expanded to include authority over
certain conduct that took place elsewhere but whose effects were felt within the regulating
state." Hannah L. Buxbaum, Territory, Territoriality, and the Resolution of Jurisdictional
Conflict, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 631, 636 (2009). See also Hannah L. Buxbaum, Introduction-
Operationalizing Global Governance, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 1-5 (2009).
15. SASSEN, supra note 1, at 1-24.
16. See A Global Perspective on Current Regulatory Reform, supra note 9, at 457-62.
17. In TERRITORY, AuTHoRITY, RIGHTS, I first used this notion to capture material
practices, which through their repetition, begin to make an informal jurisdiction. See
SASSEN, supra note 1, at 31-73. I used the example of medieval traders and craftsmen who
through their inter-city traveling had "produced a specific type of spatiality. This
spatiality wormed its way into territories encased in multiple, formal, nonurban
jurisdictions-feudal, ecclesiastical, and imperial." SASSEN, supra note 1, at 29. In chapter
5, I describe a more abstract version of this process in discussing the installing of the
needs of global finance and global firms in national state policies and laws from the 1980s
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these informal jurisdictions as the equivalent of the terra nullius-that
which was not mapped now becoming that which cannot be mapped in a
world that is still formally divided into national state jurisdictions.
Such an inquiry requires a conceptual shift away from the borders
of the nation-state as the site of change and of meaning.' 8 The
overriding of borders is an important focus in the scholarship about the
weakening of state authority over its territory. 19 More generally, writing
on the state has tended to focus on the battles to gain territory and the
work of securing the sovereign's authority over its territory.20 As a
result, in much scholarly writing, territory has largely ceased to work
analytically because it has been reduced to a singular meaning-
national territory. This emphasis is also evident in the scholarship
focused on the partial overriding of state authority that came about with
the formation of the global economy emerging in the 1980s, when
nonstate actors and instruments gained influence over the state. This
topic is one that I have examined elsewhere. 21
There is a vast range of analyses and interpretations about the
impacts of these new types of global regulators and global firms on the
state's exclusive jurisdiction. 22 Examples of structural holes in the
onwards, where they are dressed as norms originating in the interests of the state, for
public benefit. See SASSEN, supra note 1, 222-76.
18. See generally Saskia Sassen, Bordering Capabilities Versus Borders: Implications
for National Borders, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 567 (2009) (discussing through multiple
examples how borders are moving away from traditional geographic borders and towards
industry specific or activity specific boundaries).
19. See generally JOHN AGNEW, HEGEMONY: THE NEW SHAPE OF GLOBAL POWER (2005);
SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 10;
James Anderson, The Shifting Stage of Politics: New Medieval and Postmodern
Territorialities?, 14 ENV'T & PLAN. D: SOC'Y & SPACE 133 (1996); Paul Schiff Berman, The
Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (2002); Peter J. Taylor, The State as
Container: Territoriality in the Modern World-System, 18 PROGRESS IN HUM. GEOGRAPHY
151 (1994).
20. See ERIC HELLEINER, STATES AND THE REEMERGENCE OF GLOBAL FINANCE: FROM
BRETTON WOODS TO THE 1990S (1994); Stephen D. Krasner, Westphalia and All That, in
IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 235 (Judith
Goldstein & Robert 0. Keohane eds., 1993); Louis W. Pauly, Global Finance, Political
Authority, and the Problem of Legitimation, in THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 76 (Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002); LINDA
WEISS, THE MYTH OF THE POWERLESS STATE: GOVERNING THE ECONOMY IN A GLOBAL ERA
(1998); Philip G. Cerny, Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of Political
Globalization, 32 GOV'T & OPPOSITION 251 (1997); Eric Helleiner, Explaining the
Globalization of Financial Markets: Bringing the State Back In, 2 REV.INT'L POL. ECON.
315 (1995).
21. SASSEN, supra note 1, 222-76.
22. This generated a strong and cross-disciplinary debate beginning in the 1990s and
continuing today about the traditional bases of state power and authority over its
territory. See, e.g., Phillip G. Cerny, Structuring the Political Arena: Public Goods, States
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tissue of formal state authority over its territory abound, even though
the language of structural holes is not used. I have selected some cases
examined in the Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, yet another
way of recognizing the Journal's twentieth anniversary. Let me state
promptly and emphatically that the authors do not use the imagery I
use nor are they concerned with the larger question I am after here. But
it is perhaps precisely because of this that they are worth using as
examples, to point to the breadth of treatment that this issue has been
given even though the authors may have been after specific
developments that do not correspond to my inquiry.
One area is the rise of corporate actors in transnational lawmaking.
Till Miiller 23 looks at this area in general, Jane Levit 24 explores it
through the case of export credit, and Katharyne Michell and Katherine
Beckett 25 through the case of transnational finance. Larry Backer, 26 by
contrast, argues that global surveillance activities have become a
substitute for governance in the case of finance. Another area is
explored by Tim Baines, 27 who looks at the voluntary participation of
transnational corporations (TNCs) in transnational social responsibility
initiatives. Gustavo Ribero28 similarly examines the links between
voluntary participation in transnational corporate social responsibility
and Governance in a Globalizing World, in GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: CONTEMPORARY
THEORIES 21 (Ronen Palan ed., 2000); Stephen Gill, Globalization, Democratization, and
the Politics of Indifference. in GLOBALIZATION: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS 205 (James H.
Mittelman ed., 1996); REIMAGINING THE FUTURE: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE (Stephen Gill ed., forthcoming 2013); GLOBALIZATION THEORY: APPROACHES
AND CONTROVERSIES (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2007); PAUL HIRST &
GRAHAME THOMPSON, GLOBALIZATION IN QUESTION: THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY AND
THE POSSIBILITIES OF GOVERNANCE (1996); Eric Helleiner, Sovereignty, Territoriality and
the Globalization of Finance in STATES AND SOVEREIGNTY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (David
A. Smith, Dorothy J. Solinger & Steven C. Topik eds., 1999); COMPARATIVE LAW AS
TRANSNATIONAL LAW: A DECADE OF THE GERMAN LAW JOURNAL (Russel A. Miler & Peer C.
Zumbansen eds., 2011); Pauly, supra note 20.
23. Till Miller, Customary Transnational Law: Attacking the Last Resort of State
Sovereignty, IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 19 (2008).
24. Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-Up Lawmaking: The Private Origins of Transnational
Law, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 49 (2008).
25. Katharyne Mitchell & Katherine Beckett, Securing the Global City: Crime,
Consulting, Risk, and Ratings in the Production of Urban Space, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 75 (2008).
26. Larry CatA Backer, Global Panopticism: States, Corporations, and the Governance
Effects of Monitoring Regimes, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 101 (2008).
27. Tim Baines, Integration of Corporate Social Responsibility Through International
Voluntary Initiatives, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 223 (2009).
28. Gustavo Ferreira Ribeiro, Navigating the Turbulent Waters Connecting the World
Trade Organization and Corporate Social Responsibility, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
249 (2009).
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initiatives and WTO enforcement regimes. Gunther Teubner 29 examines
the linkages between private and public legal regimes in the governance
of TNCs, finding that national law often fails to exercise binding force
on the behavior of TNCs, in contrast to voluntary participation in
private codes of conduct, which he argues are emergent transnational
regimes; at the same time, public state actors have been key in
facilitating the rise in private regulation through their promotion of free
markets.
These and other developments have led to a conceptual
repositioning of the concept of the state's territorial authority-
territoriality.30 But overall it remains close to its original intended
meaning, exclusive state sovereign power over its territory. Kal
Raustiala criticizes what he labels "legal spatiality," namely the notion
that "[t]he scope and reach of the law is connected to territory, and
therefore, spatial location determines the operative legal regime."31
There are many more such indications of a misalignment between
territory and territoriality.
I use such misalignments to examine what the imperfect scope and
reach of the law can make visible in terms of structural holes in the
jurisdiction of national sovereign territory. One mode this misalignment
takes is to operate or oscillate between formal and informal global
governance. An example is that of transnational environmental
governance. Brian Winchester writes on the increasing interplay
between state and nonstate actors (e.g. NGOs and activist networks) in
the development of transnational environmental regulations, resulting
in a version of global governance that is more complex than simple
international agreements. 32 Tun Myint 33 also writes on the interplay of
state and nonstate actors in global environmental governance, with a
focus on transnational institutions. Michael Ewing-Chow and Darryl
Soh,34 meanwhile, examine the shift from a focus on cooperation and
coordination between states in international environmental agreements
29. Gunther Teubner, Self-Constitutionalizing TNCs? On the Linkage of 'Private" and
"Public" Corporate Codes of Conduct, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 617 (2011).
30. See generally COMPARATIVE LAW AS TRANSNATIONAL LAW: A DECADE OF THE
GERMAN LAW JOURNAL, supra note 22; A Global Perspective on Current Regulatory
Reform, supra note 9.
31. Kal Raustialia, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2506 (2005).
32. N. Brian Winchester, Emerging Global Envirnmental Governance, 16 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 7 (2009).
33. Tun Myint, Globalization and the Institutional Dynamics of Global Environmental
Governance, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 395 (2011).
34. Michael Ewing-Chow & Darryl Soh, Pain, Gain, or Shame: The Evolution of
Environmental Law and the Role of Multinational Corporations, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 195 (2009).
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to a focus on enforced compliance in global environmental regulation. In
the latter, corporations, rather than states, are the primary targets for
transnational environmental legal regimes.
The dilution of the state's formal power over its territory tends to
take on specific forms and produce specific redistributions of power
across diverse state branches. One such specific form is the case of
national legislative jurisdictions losing their grip on a growing range of
domains over which they once had regulatory power, or at least formal
authority. One mode of adapting to this loss has been precisely to pass
laws that deregulate and privatize what was once regulated and public.
That was a short burst of lawmaking that had the effect of shrinking
the domain where legislatures were the key state branch.
35
Deregulation and privatization have led to a widespread understanding
that the "national-state" loses authority with globalization.
36
Elsewhere, 37 I have examined how even as corporate globalization
reduced the power of national legislative jurisdiction, it enabled a
relatively greater concentration of unaccountable power in the
executive.
Next I turn briefly to three examples that are part of the larger
project on which this essay is based.
III. EMERGENT JURISDICTIONS
A. Extraterritorial Immigration Control Through Interdiction of Vessels
at Sea
Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees, which covers non-refoulement, holds that "[n]o Contracting
State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would
be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group or political opinion."38 A number of countries
35. E.g., A Global Perspective on Current Regulatory Reform, supra note 9.
36. For a discussion of the state focusing on battles to gain territory and securing the
sovereign's authority, see generally HELLEINER, supra note 20; Krasner, supra note 20;
Pauly, supra note 20; WEISS, supra note 20; Helleiner, supra note 20; Cerny, supra note
20.
37. SASSEN, supra note 1, 148-221.
38. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150,
Art. 33, 1 (emphasis added), available at http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/
3b66c2aa10.pdf. For articles discussing the Convention, see Andrew Brouwer & Judith
Kumin, Interception and Asylum: When Migration Control and Human Rights Collide, 21
REFUGE, no. 4, at 6 (2003), available at http://pi.library.yorku.ca/ojs/index.php/refuge/
article/ viewFile/21305/19976; Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, The Refugee, the Sovereign
VISIBLE FORMALIZATIONS AND FORMALLY INVISIBLE FACTICITIES 13
interdict or intercept ships carrying irregular migrants at sea as a way
of evading their obligation of non-refoulement in the practice of
immigration control. 39
Interdiction of irregular migrants at sea variously involves either
transferring migrants to extraterritorial migration processing centers,
so-called "push-backs" or "tow-backs," where ships are forced back into
international waters (prohibited from entering territorial waters) or
physically towing the vessels all the way back to the country of
departure. In the case of the former, the transfer of irregular migrants
to extraterritorial migration processing centers allows states to evade
their own national laws regarding immigration protections, while
ostensibly adhering to international refugee law in cases of asylum
seeking.40 Moreover, in cases where asylum is granted, migrants can be
resettled in third countries rather than in the country to which they
and the Sea: EU Interdiction Policies in the Mediterranean, (Danish Institute for
International Studies, Working Paper No. 2008/6, 2008), available at
http://www.diis.dk/graphics/PublicationsWP2008WP08-
6_Refugee-Sovereign-SeaEU%201nterdiction_PoliciesMediterranean.pdf (arguing that
it is "the growing trend in the EU of enacting migration control at the high seas or
international waters-so-called interdiction. It is argued that these forms of
extraterritorial migration control aim at reconquering the efficiency of the sovereign
function to control migration.").
39. In introducing interdiction, Bernard Ryan offers two primary cases: unauthorized
Jewish arrivals in Palestine in the late 1930s and Vietnamese "boat people" in 1975-1992.
Bernard Ryan, Extraterritorial Immigration Control: What Role for Legal Guarantees?, in
EXTRATERRITORIAL IMMIGRATION CONTROL: LEGAL CHALLENGES 22-24 (Bernard Ryan &
Valsamis Mitsilegas eds., 2010). See also ELEANOR TAYLOR NICHOLSON, THE CHIEF JUST.
EARL WARREN INST. L. & SOC. POLY, CUTTING OFF THE FLOW: EXTRATERRITORIAL
CONTROLS TO PREVENT MIGRATION 2 (2011), available at http://eucenter.berkeley.edu/files/
IssueBrief_2011_Final.pdf ("This issue brief explores the extent to which the United
States, Europe and European governments have implemented different extraterritorial
controls."); Seline Trevisanut, The Principle of Non-Refoulement at Sea and the
Effectiveness of Asylum Protection, 12 MAX PLANCK Y.B.U.N.L. 205 (A. von Bogdandy & R.
Wolfrum eds., 2008), available at http://www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/pdfmpunyb/
05_trevisanutj12.pdf ("This article elucidates how the exercise of sovereign powers in
different maritime zones pursuant to the law of the sea and customary international law
gives rise to challenges in the application of the principle of non-refoulement and in the
protection of asylum-seekers and refugees at sea. Particular attention must be given to
the so-called non-reentrie mechanisms made principally to prevent a refugee from having
access to the procedures for the determination of his/her status. Among those are the
interdiction at sea programs.").
40. See Brouwer & Kumin, supra note 38. Here is a quote from UNHCR: "Many States
which have the ability to do so find that intercepting migrants before they reach their
territories is one of the most effective measures to enforce their domestic migration laws
and policies." United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Refugee Protection and
Migration Control: Perspectives from UNHCR and IOM, UN Doc. EC/GC/01/11 14 (May
31, 2001), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/dfid/3b3701b813.pdf.
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were originally headed.41 In the case of the latter, interdicting countries
effectively turn over their responsibilities toward irregular migrants
under international law to the country of departure based on specific
agreements in place with the country of departure. 42
1. U.S. Interdiction Practices
The United States practices a "wet foot/dry foot" approach to
interdiction of irregular migrants within U.S. territorial waters, under
which the protections of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
are deemed to apply only to migrants who reach the shore.43 Outside of
its territorial waters-at high sea and in the territorial waters of other
countries, pursuant to official agreements-U.S. interdiction policies
have been in effect since 1981 for ships without a flag or where the
United States has an agreement in place with a flag state.44 U.S. Coast
Guard interdiction is concentrated in the Caribbean and has included
regular patrols of the Windward Passage (between Haiti and Cuba)
since 1981, the Straits of Florida since 1994, and the Mona Passage
(between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico) since 1995. 4 5 From
41. See Ryan, supra note 39, at 3.
42. For an article offering a good explanation of the issues at stake in the case, even
though focused on Italy, see Violeta Moreno-Lax, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy or the
Strasbourg Court versus Extraterritorial Migration Control?, 12 HuM. RTS L. REV. 574
(2012). For the judgment, see Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. no.
27765/09 (2012), available at http://www.unhcr.orgrefworlddocid
4f4507942.html.
43. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1101-1537 (2013). For an article
discussing the Act, see generally Niels Frenzen, US Migrant Interdiction Practices in
International and Territorial Waters, in EXTRATERRITORIAL IMMIGRATION CONTROL:
LEGAL CHALLENGES, supra note 39, at 375. For an article going through the policy
regarding Cubans and Haitians, see Alberto J. Perez, Wet Foot, Dry Foot, No Foot: The
Recurring Controversy Between Cubans, Haitians, and the United States Immigration
Policy, 28 NOVA L. REv. 437, 454 (2004). Here is a pertinent quote: "I have made it
abundantly clear to the Coast Guard that we will turn back any refugee that attempts to
reach our shore." Bill Frelick, 'Abundantly Clear" Refoulment, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 245,
245(2004) (quoting President George W. Bush speaking on Feb. 25, 2004). See also
Trevisanut, supra note 39, at 221.
44. See Ryan, supra note 39, at 25. For an article written by a Captain in the U.S.
Coast Guard citing much of the case law around interdiction operations at sea through
1996, see Gary W. Palmer, Guarding the Coast: Alien Migrant Interdiction Operations at
Sea, 29 CONN. L. REv. 1565 (1997). See also Louis B. Sohn, Interdiction of Vessels on the
High Seas, 18 INT'L LAW. 411 (1984) (starting with President Reagan's September 29,
1981 proclamation declaring that the "entry of undocumented aliens from the high seas is
hereby suspended and shall be prevented by the interdiction of certain vessels carrying
such aliens.").
45. Ryan, supra note 39, at 24; Palmer, supra note 44. Let me clarify that Coast Guard
interdiction was for the purposes of both migration and drug trafficking. Missions:
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1982-2009, 114,718 Haitian, 66,702 Cubans, and 25,756 Dominicans
have been interdicted in these operations. 46 In similar operations in the
Pacific, 5,912 Chinese nationals (mostly headed to Guam) and 8,257
Ecuadorian nationals-among others-have been interdicted since the
late 1990s. 47
Where there is a specific agreement in place, as there is with Haiti
for example, interdicted migrants are immediately returned to the
country of departure. 48 In other cases, ships are "pushed back" to
international waters. 49 To avoid violating the non-refoulement principle
of international law, which applies within territorial waters (and
potentially beyond as discussed in the case of Italy below), the United
States transfers those interdicted in its territorial waters, as well as
those claiming protection (whether in territorial waters or at high sea),
to extraterritorial processing centers such as Guant~namo Bay.50 In
Sale vs. Haitian Centers Council, decided in 1993, the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the U.S. practice of interdiction at high sea by ruling that
the prohibition of non-refoulement did not apply extraterritorially.5'
Notably, irregular migrants interdicted by the U.S. Coast Guard en
route from Cuba or China are automatically informed of their right to
appeal for protection, whereas migrants from other places must
spontaneously make such a request.5 2
2. Australian Interdiction Practices
Australia has used U.S. interdiction policy as a model for its own
practices, most notably those of the Howard government, which
included "tow-backs" and the notorious "Pacific Solution" practiced from
2001-2007. 53 These so-called "tow-backs" involved the interdiction of
Maritime Safety, U.S. COAST GuARD, http://www.uscg.mil/top/missions/
MaritimeSecurity.asp (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
46. Ryan, supra note 39, at 24-25. These numbers come from Ryan's accessing U.S.
Coast Guard statistics on Nov. 3, 2009. See US Coast Guard, Alien Migrant Interdiction:
Total Interdictions-Fiscal Year 1982 to Present, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/
FlowStats/FY.asp (last visited Mar. 24, 2013).
47. Ryan, supra note 39, at 25.
48. Id. at 27.
49. See Trevisanut, supra note 39, at 241; Frelick, supra note 43, at 257.
50. Ryan, supra note 39, at 26.
51. Jan Arno Hessbruegge, European Court of Human Rights Protects Migrants
Against 'Push Back" Operations on the High Seas, AM. SOCY INT'L L. INSIGHTS (Apr. 17,
2012), http://www.asil.org/insightsl20417.cfm.
52. Frenzen, supra note 43.
53. See Penelope Mathew, Legal Issues Concerning Interception, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
221, 221 (2003); Tara Magner, A Less than 'Pacific' Solution for Asylum Seekers in
Australia, 16 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 53 (2004).
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ships en route from Indonesia, which were then towed by Australian
authorities back to Indonesian shores in accordance with specific
agreement with the Indonesian government. 54 The Pacific Solution,
implemented in cases where ships were carrying asylum seekers from
places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Sri Lanka, involved transferring
interdicted irregular migrants to extraterritorial immigration
processing centers on Nauru and Manus Islands in Papua New Guinea.
The Pacific Solution was ended by the Rudd government shortly
after it took power and, starting in 2008, migrants interdicted at sea
have been transferred to the offshore processing center on Australia's
Christmas Island.55 This is a place where irregular migrants can access
lawyers and interpreters, however, "the fact that Christmas Island is
'excised' from the migration zone means that their claims continue to be
assessed outside of the standard legal mechanisms governing asylum
claims."
56
3. Italy's Interdiction Practices and the 2012 ECtHR Ruling
Against It
Since the 1990s, Italy has been interdicting ships carrying irregular
migrants. However, until early 2009, migrants were generally permitted
to land and have any asylum claims processed before being
repatriated.57  However, in May 2009 Italy began practicing
"push-backs" wherein coastal authorities would interdict ships departed
from Libya carrying irregular migrants on the high seas, take migrants
54. See generally Susan Kneebone, Controlling Migration by Sea: The Australian Case,
in EXTRATERRITORIAL IMMIGRATION CONTROL: LEGAL CHALLENGES, supra note 39, at 347.
55. Ryan, supra note 39, at 29. Here, Ryan is drawing on several newspaper reports,
among which: Craig Skehan, Pacific Solution Ends but Tough Stance to Remain, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, Dec. 8, 2007, available at
http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/pacific-solution-ends-but-tough-stance-to-
remain2007/12/07/1196813021259.html; Refugee Status Given to Burmese; Swift end to
'Pacific Solution,'THE AGE, Dec. 10, 2007; David Crawshaw, Government Denies Back Flip
on Island Excision, THE AGE, Feb. 21, 2008, available at
http://news.theage.com.aunational/govt-denies-backflip-on-island-excision-20080221-
ltmq.html.
56. Ryan, supra note 39, at 29. Ryan refers the reader to another chapter in the
volume: Kneebone, supra note 54. See also Brouwer & Kumin, supra note 38. Here is an
illuminating quote from UNHCR that begins that article: 'Many States which have the
ability to do so find that intercepting migrants before they reach their territories is one of
the most effective measures to enforce their domestic migration laws and policies." United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Refugee Protection and Migration Control:
Perspectives from UNHCR and IOM, supra note 40.
57. See Alessia di Pascale, Migration Control at Sea: The Italian Case, in
EXTRATERRITORIAL IMMIGRATION CONTROL: LEGAL CHALLENGES, supra note 39, at 281.
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onboard, and return them directly to Libya without investigating
possible claims for protection or even determining nationality (many
irregular migrants coming from Libya were from third-world countries
in sub-Saharan Africa). 58 Thus, a group of Somali and Eritrean
migrants turned over to Libyan authorities by Italian authorities
brought their case to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in
Hirsi Jamaa et al. v. Italy.59
In their decision on Hirsi Jamaa et al. v. Italy, delivered on
February 23, 2012, the ECtHR judges hearing the case unanimously
ruled that Italy had failed to uphold its obligations to protect the
applicants from torture and inhumane or degrading treatment under
Article 3 of the European Convention and from the collective expulsion
of non-nationals, 60 even though the applicants never reached Italy's
territorial water. This decision effectively extended European human
rights law extraterritorially.
The ECtHR's ruling falls in line with The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) long held position that
non-refoulement applies in cases where refugees and persons in need of
protection fall under the effective control of a state acting outside of its
territory (including territorial waters). 61 The ECtHR decision also noted
that Italy put applicants at risk of secondary refoulement as Libya
might have arbitrarily repatriated them as Libya, under Qaddafi, did
not observe international refugee law. While the refoulement decision
was expected, the finding that Italy violated the prohibition on collective
expulsion was less so. As reporter Jan Hessbruegge explains,
58. Ryan, supra note 39, at 31-32.
59. Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. no. 27765/09 (2012), available
at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4f4507942.html.
60. Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 4, May 2, 1968, E.T.S. No. 46; for the reasons for this
decision, see Hirsi Jamaa and Others, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. no. 27765/09 at 57-59. The
European Court of Human Rights fact sheet on Expulsions and extraditions summarizes
the Article violations in the Hirsi Jamaa et al v. Italy case. See Expulsions and
Extraditions, EUR. CT. H.R. (Feb. 2013), http://www.echr.coe.intNRl
rdonlyres21 1A6F9C-A4EC-4CF7-AB2E-
42E9D49FB2EF/0/FICHESExpulsionsetextraditionsEN.pdf.
61. See generally U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR's Oral Intervention
at the European Court of Human Rights--Hearing of the Case Hirsi and Others v. Italy
(June 22, 2011), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e0356d42.html; written
intervention by U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees to U.N. Eur. Ct. H.R., Submission
by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in the Case of Hirsi
and Others v. Italy (Mar. 29, 2011), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworldldocid/
4d92d2c22.html; Intervener Brief for U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Hirsi
Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. no. 27765/09 (2011), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4f5flla52.html.
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Insisting on the ordinary sense of the word "expulsion,"
Italy strenuously argued that only a person who had
actually reached the state's territory could be subject to
expulsion. The prohibition of collective expulsion, Italy
advanced, only came into play when individuals already
within the territory of a state, or those who had crossed
the national border illegally, were expelled. Conversely,
the applicants took the position that pushing back
migrants on the high seas could constitute hidden
expulsions. They also noted that Italian law considered
ships flying the Italian flag to be Italian territory, which
implied that removing the applicants from the Italian
coast guard vessels was tantamount to expelling them
from Italian territory. 62
As well as extending European human rights law extraterritorially
to include European ships at sea, the ECtHR ruling in the Hirsi case
against collective expulsion implicated the failure of Italian officials to
individually assess irregular migrants' protection claims.63 Accordingly,
the ruling found that "push back operations without such individualized
assessment are therefore generally illegal, regardless of where the
victims are pushed back (e.g., a place like Libya under Qaddafi or
another, more secure state)."64
B. U.S. Overseas Military Bases-Infrastructure and Jurisdiction
1. U.S. Military Infrastructure Abroad
The United States maintains the most extensive network of foreign
military bases in the world. The Pentagon's published numbers put the
total number of U.S. military bases abroad at 750.65 However, this
62. Hessbruegge, supra note 51, at 3.
63. For discussion of the "individual assessment" issue, see EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR
THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT,
22ND GENERAL REPORT OF THE CPT 17 (2012), available at
http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/annual/rep-22.pdf; Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Eur. Ct.
H.R. App. no. 27765/09 at 52-53 (2012), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid
4f4507942.html (discussing in the section labeled third party interveners).
64. Hessbruegge, supra note 51, at 4.
65. Cora Fabros, BASES OF EMPIRE: The Global Spread of U.S. Military and
Intelligence Bases, CONVERGE (2008),
http://www.converge.org.nz/abc/pr37-1721.html (providing the average number of bases
from 2003 to 2005 at a figure of more than 750 based upon the 2005 U.S. Department of
Defense publication Base Structure 2005). There has been considerable change in the logic
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number does not include any entries for bases in Afghanistan due to the
ongoing conflict there, leading some to estimate the total number of
foreign bases at over 1,000.66 In either case, this is a massive network
that spans every continent (including Antarctica) and includes eleven
aircraft carriers at sea (essentially floating bases), and even a growing
military infrastructure in space. Using just the official Pentagon
numbers, reporter Nick Turse writes,
What we do know is that, on the foreign outposts the
U.S. military counts, it controls close to 52,000
buildings, and more than 38,000 pieces of heavy
infrastructure like piers, wharves, and gigantic storage
tanks, not to mention more than 9,100 "linear
structures" like runways, rail lines, and pipelines. Add
in more than 6,300 buildings, 3,500 pieces of
infrastructure, and 928 linear structures in U.S.
territories and you have an impressive total.67
While in recent years the United States has been downsizing its
largest military bases-the city-sized bases from the Cold War era in
countries like Germany and South Korea-it has been quietly
expanding its network of smaller bases around the world. 68 These
so-called "lily pad bases" (picture a frog hopping from lily pad to lily pad
as it makes its way around a pond) are described by anthropologist
David Vine as becoming "a critical part of an evolving Washington
military strategy aimed at maintaining U.S. global dominance by doing
far more with less in an increasingly competitive, ever more multi-polar
world."69 The expansion of these smaller lily pad bases makes it harder
of basing since, with new types of bases added and older types closed. See DEP'T OF DEF.,
BASE STRUCTURE REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2012 BASELINE (2012), available at
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/download/bsr/BSR2012Baseline.pdf [hereinafter DEP'T OF DEF.].
66. See Nick Turse, Tomgram: Nick Turse, The Pentagon's Planet of Bases,
TOMDISPATCH (Jan. 9, 2011, 5:13 PM), http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175338/
tomgram%3A-nickturse%2C the-pentagon%27splanet of_bases (providing a detailed
accounting of how different estimates of the total number of U.S. military bases abroad
have been calculated by various officials and journalists).
67. Id.
68. David Vine, Tomgram: David Vine, U.S. Empire of Bases Grows, TOMDISPATCH
(July 15, 2012, 5:32 PM), http://www.tomdispatch.com/archive/175568 ("While the
collection of Cold War-era giant bases around the world is shrinking, the global
infrastructure of bases overseas has exploded in size and scope."). A discussion of military
bases by size for fiscal year 2011 appears in DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 65, at 23-33.
69. David Vine, supra note 68 (discussing the 'lily-pad" strategy). See also Ann Scott
Tyson, New US Strategy: 'Lily Pad' Bases, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 10, 2004),
http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0810/p06s02-wosc.html.
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to get a precise count of U.S. military bases abroad, as bases less than
ten acres or valued at less than $10 million are either aggregated into a
single entry or not counted at all in the Pentagon's official numbers.
Moreover, some lily pad bases are ostensibly temporary and some are
secret, or "black sites," making the total number impossible to count.70
2. Jurisdiction over U.S. Military Personnel and Contractors
Abroad
For permanent military bases outside of warzones, precise details of
criminal jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel, their dependents, and
civilians working on the bases are presented in Status of Forces
Agreements (SOFAs) set-up between the United States and the host
nation on an individualized basis. 71 However, in many so-called
"black-sites" and "lily pad" bases, there are no SOFAs in place.7 2 In such
situations, the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)-the
martial courts system-and the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Act of 2000 (MEJA) extend U.S. military and civilian jurisdiction,
respectively, outside U.S. territory. 73
The UMCJ applies to all military personnel within, as well as
outside of, U.S. territory, effectively extending U.S. military jurisdiction
to cover U.S. military personnel wherever they are located.7 4 MEJA,
meanwhile, extends U.S. federal (civilian) jurisdiction broadly to cover
offenses committed outside of U.S. territory such that all persons
"employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces" overseas can be
prosecuted for any offense punishable by at least one year.75 MEJA
covers civilians accompanying the U.S. military (such as dependents) or
those directly employed by the Department of Defence (DoD), as well as
70. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 65, at 4 ('To qualify for individual entry in the BSR, a
DoD site located in the United States must be larger than 10 acres AND have a Plant
Replacement Value (PRV) greater than $10 million. If the site is located in a foreign
country, it must be larger than 10 acres OR have a PRV greater than $10 million to be
shown as a separate entry.").
71. For a detailed discussion of SOFAs see R. CHUCK MASON, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE PUB. No. RL34531, STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT (SOFA): WHAT IS
IT, AND How HAS IT BEEN UTILIZED (2012).
72. See Mason, supra note70, at 8.
73. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. ch. 47 (2013).
74. 10 U.S.C. § 802 (2013) (listing the persons subject to the Uniform Code of Military
Justice).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (2013) ("Criminal offenses committed by certain members of the
Armed Forces and by persons employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the
United States" are included in the extraterritorial jurisdiction).
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private military contractors and subcontractors of the DoD.76 In October
2004, MEJA was expanded to include civilian employees of other federal
agencies or "any provisional authority" whose employment is related to
or in support of the DoD. 77 In 2007, the U.S. House of Representatives
passed the MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act of 2007 (MEJA
Expansion Act), which would have extended the reach of MEJA to all
contractors in an area where the Armed Forces were conducting a
contingency mission regardless of whether or not they were associated
with the DoD. 78 However, the bill did not pass the Senate. 79
However, whether or not the MEJA Expansion Act had been passed,
it is unlikely that it would have led to more effective prosecution of
civilian contractors abroad. To prosecute contractors for crimes
committed overseas under MEJA, U.S. federal investigators have to
gather evidence in far off places, including dangerous warzones, where
there are likely to be access and language barriers, as well as practical
difficulties in gathering evidence weeks or even months after an offense
was committed. As Peter W. Singer notes, MEJA assumes that civilian
prosecutors have the resources and motivation to investigate and
prosecute offenses committed overseas when "[t]he reality is that no US
Attorney likes to waste limited budgets on such messy, complex cases
9,000 miles outside their district, even if they were fortunate enough to
have the evidence at hand."80 Katherin Chapman also points out, with
regards to MEJA, that the U.S. military is increasingly dependent on
private contractors, and "[w]ith such a strong reliance on these
contractors, federal investigators and prosecutors may face pressure to
not fully investigate or prosecute cases."8' The only successful
76. Id. See also Marc Lindemann, Civilian Contractors Under Military Law,
PARAMETERS (2007), available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/
07autumn/lindeman.pdf.
77. This change was made through the FY 2005 DoD Authorization Act. For a very
detailed (though authored by the military) summary of what the 2004 change was
designed to do, see Glenn R. Schmitt, Amending the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Act (MEJA) of 2000: Rushing to Close an Unforeseen Loophole, ARMY LAW, June 2005, at
41.
78. MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act of 2007, H.R. 2740, 110th Cong. (2007).
79. "This bill was introduced in a previous session of Congress and was passed by the
House on October 4, 2007 but was never passed by the Senate." MEJA Expansion and
Enforcement Act of 2007, GovTrack.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/l10/hr2740
(last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
80. Peter W. Singer, The Law Catches Up to Private Militaries, Embeds, BROOKINGS
(Jan. 4, 2007), http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2007/01/04defenseindustry-
singer.
81. Katherin J. Chapman, The Untouchables: Private Military Contractors' Criminal
Accountability Under the UCMJ, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1047, 1065 (9th Cir. 2010).
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prosecution carried out under MEJA involved the stabbing of a U.S.
soldier by his wife on a military base in Turkey.8 2
Before 2007, military contractors were subject to UCMJ only in
situations where Congress had declared war-which it has not done
since WWII.83 However, the UCMJ was expanded in the 2007 Military
Authorization Act to cover civilian contractors employed in military
contingency operations abroad. 84 This closes a significant loophole
wherein private military contractors could commit crimes abroad with
impunity, despite the applicability of MEJA in such cases. However, it
remains to be seen how UCMJ will be applied to civilian contractors
abroad and whether the application of military rule to civilians will
raise any constitutional challenges.
C. The Partial Disassembling of National Territory
The acquisition of land by foreign governments and foreign firms is
a centuries-old process in much of the world. But we can detect specific
phases in these long and diverse histories. In this essay I focus on the
most recent phase in this long history: the rapid and sharp increase in
foreign land acquisitions beginning in 2006. While this can be seen
merely as a continuation of an old practice, the available evidence points
to significant change in the curve describing the size of overall
acquisitions.85 From 2006 to 2010, over 70 million hectares of land were
82. United States v. Arnt, 474 F. 3d 1159 (2007). For an article discussing the case see
Sara Catania, Death at Incirlik, LEGAL AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2004, available at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/November-December-2004/story-catania-novdec04.msp.
83. Lindemann, supra note 76, at 83.
84. The change was to Article 2 of the UCMJ--expanding from war to "war or a
contingency operation." 10 U.S.C. § 802(10) (2013). For an article specifically about the
implication of changing "war" to "declared war or a contingency operation" see Peter W.
Singer, The Law Catches Up to Private Militaries, Embeds, BROOKINGS (Jan. 4, 2007),
http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2007/01/04defenseindustry-singer.
85. See generally WARD ANSEEUW ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LAND DEALS FOR
AGRICULTURE IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH: ANALYTICAL REPORT BASED ON THE LAND MATRIX
DATABASE (2012), available at http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/publication/
1254/Analytical%2OReport%2OWeb.pdf; SATURINO M. BORRAS JR. ET AL., LAND GRABBING
IN LATIN AMERICAN AND THE CARIBBEAN VIEWED FROM BROADER INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES (2011), available at http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/
borras franco kay__spoorjlandgrabs-in latamcaribbean nov_2011.pdf; LORENZO
COTULA, INT'L LAND COAL., COMMERCIAL PRESSURES ON LAND: THE OUTLOOK ON
FARMLAND ACQUISITIONS (2011), available at http://www.ibcperu.org/docdisis/13570.pdf;
KLAUS DEININGER ET AL., RISING GLOBAL INTEREST IN FARMLAND: CAN IT YIELD SUSTAINABLE
AND EQUITABLE BENEFITS? (2011), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org
INTARD/Resources/ESWSept7_finaLfinal.pdf; U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD
INVESTMENT REPORT: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT (2009), available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/wir2009_en.pdf; Olivier De
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bought or leased for which we can establish both buyers and sellers; this
figure jumps to over 200 million hectares if we consider all reported
sales.8 6
What is of great concern here is the sharp change in the curve of
acquisitions; it points to a break in a long-term trend, a break that
might indicate a structural transformation in an old practice. The larger
context within which this growth takes place is characterized by
changes in the global economy and in financial markets, and, at a
deeper level, changes in the larger interstate system, which is still the
basic frame for cross-border transactions. Further, the financializing of
commodities has brought new potentials for profit making to the
primary sector, from food to minerals and metals, thus stimulating
speculative investments in land.
Analytically, and in terms of the question organizing this essay, I
see the facts of this sharp rise since 2006 as more significant to
understanding the current period than the long-term trend towards
acquiring foreign land. For example, in older imperial histories of land
appropriation, as early as the 1960s, Japan was acquiring land in Asia
and Brazil to grow food for its own consumption. The post-2006
acquisitions demonstrate a shift in the meaning and the modes of such
land acquisitions.
One key difference with past imperial and colonial modes is that the
world today is mostly, even if not completely, divided into putatively
independent nation-states.8 7 Clearly, formal sovereignty can easily
Schutter, How Not to Think of Land Grabbing: Three Critiques of Large-Scale Investments
in Farmland, 38 J. PEASANT STUD. 249 (2011), available at http://www.tandfonline.com/
doilpdf/10.1080/03066150.2011.559008. For an online public database on land deals see
Land Portal, LAND MATRIX, http:/Iandportal.info/landmatrix (last visited Mar. 27, 2013).
86. See ANSEEUW ET AL., supra note 85; COTULA, supra note 85; Land Portal, supra
note 85. The Land Matrix database contains information about two types of data covering
respectively acquisitions "reported" (200 million plus hectares) and "cross-checked."
"Reported" data cover deals presented in published research reports and media reports
and government registers where these are made public. "Cross-checked" data refer to
those reported deals that are referenced from multiple sources; the cross-checking process
involves an assessment of the reliability of the source of the information, triangulation
with other information sources, and, if necessary, confirming with in-country partners in
the networks of the Land Matrix partners. Media reports are not considered sufficient for
cross-referencing. Research reports based on fieldwork, confirmation by known in-country
partners, or official land records have been considered sufficient evidence. See What
Methodology Does the Land Matrix Use?, Land Matrix, http://landportal.info/landmatrix/
get-the-detail#pages-methodology (last visited Mar. 27, 2013).
87. States resisted at times, but it is worth noting what states succeeded in stopping
foreign acquisitions. For instance, the United States did in the 1970s when it passed
legislation preventing foreign investors aiming to buy land in the American midwest from
doing so; at that time these were mostly from the Gulf states and Europe, who had up
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co-exist with coloniality, that is, post-historic colonialism.8 8 Yet, the
aspirations of formal sovereignty help make visible the substantive
assemblage of elements needed to execute some of these large scale
acquisitions of land in a foreign country. It is no simple matter for a
Swiss firm to buy land in Russia or for a Chinese government agency to
acquire 2.8 million hectares of land in Zambia. Taking formal
sovereignty on its terms allows me to trace the transformations that
need to take place for these acquisitions and associated investments to
be negotiated by foreign parties and a national government. It helps me
recover the work of acquiring large amounts of land in a foreign country.
Contractual arrangements are a basic element even when the two states
have unequal power to impose their will or preferences. Of interest to
the larger project on which this essay is based are the complex and
indirect contractual arrangements through which some of these
acquisitions are secured.
What is actually being measured in general descriptions of these
acquisitions can vary considerably depending on the study. I have
chosen the collectively generated data of the Land Matrix project in
collaboration with International Land Coalition,8 9 which has made a
major contribution to the subject. 90 According to their definition the
pertinent types of land acquisitions, all: (a) entail a transfer of rights to
use, control, or own land through sale, lease, or concession; (b) imply a
conversion from land used by smallholders, or for important
environmental functions, to large-scale commercial use; (c) are 200
hectares or larger; and (d) were not concluded before the year 2000
when the FAO food price index was lowest. 91
Land, broadly understood, has become one of the major new needs of
advanced capitalism-for food and industrial crops, for underground
water tables, and for traditional and new types of mining. I use the term
"traditional economies" here to refer to smallholder economies, and
until then bought mostly firms, hotels, office buildings, Hollywood cinema studios, and
more.
88. See e.g., Nelson Maldonado-Torres, On the Coloniality of Being: Contributions to the
Development of a Concept, 21 CULTURAL STUD. 240 (2007); Walter D. Mignolo, Delinking:
The Rhetoric of Modernity, the Logic of Coloniality and the Grammar of De-Coloniality, 21
CULTURAL STUD. 449 (2007); Anibal Quijano, Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality, 21
CULTURAL STUD. 168 (2007); Anibal Quijano, Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and
Latin America, 1 NEPANTLA: VIEWS FROM THE SOUTH 533 (2000).
89. See ANSEEUW, supra note 6; Land Portal, supra note 85.
90. It is important to note that acquisitions in OECD countries are generally not
reflected in the data, as private transactions between one commercial user and another
that do not involve a conversion of tenure system or away from smalholder production are
not included in the Land Matrix. It is of course the case that this definition of land
acquisitions would not be the most common in Europe.
91. See ANSEEUW ET AL., supra note 85, at vi.
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generally the absence of financialized commodification and of
corporatization. Thus, I do not include hundred years old plantations,
even though they are old. Clearly these definitions of "traditional"
economies are approximations to complex and mixed realities, subjects I
addressed in earlier work,92 and also more recently. 93 At a time of
extreme financialization and systemic transformation, the growing
demand for those material resources has ascended in importance and
visibility, and has stimulated their financializing.
The demand for resources, and what it takes to fulfill it, is part of
the systemic deepening of the current phase of capitalism. It comes
down to an expansion of the operational space for advanced capitalism
through the expulsion of people from a range of institutional settings in
both the Global South and North, with specific modalities in each. 94 The
sharp increases in displaced peoples, poverty, and illnesses that kill
even though curable are part of this new phase; they are not anomalies.
Likewise, widespread hunger and starvation are not anomalies, even
though there is plenty of food produced. Nor are these types of
juxtapositions new. They have happened in other phases of the
development of capitalist economies.
At this vast a scale, land acquisitions can transform sovereign
national territory into a far more elementary condition-land for
usufruct. The latter is not only a more elementary condition than
territory, but also is more univocal. Where territory contains logics for
claim-making (i.e. citizenship), land for usufruct by large foreign owners
would seem to go in a different direction. One way of conceiving of this
shift is as a partial and specialized reassembling of bits and pieces of
territory, authority, and rights once ensconced in the sovereign
nation-state. These have now become a stretch of land owned by a
foreign firm or government and have begun to shift towards a novel
formation. This is also an instance of what I refer to as the endogenizing
of the global into the national-in this case, a very material and visible
one.
CONCLUSION
The central focus in this article was on disassemblings taking place
inside sovereign state territory and authority. It was not concerned with
the more common subject of the deregulation of interstate borders.
92. See, e.g., SASKIA SASSEN, THE MOBILITY OF LABOR AND CAPITAL: A STUDY IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND LABOR FLow (1988).
93. Saskia Sassen, A Savage Sorting of Winners and Losers: Contemporary Versions of
Primitive Accumulation, 7 GLOBALIZATIONS 23 (2010).
94. SASSEN, supra note 7.
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I used a variety of instances that capture this disassembling. Some
consist of formally organized practices, such as the spread of contractual
governance that replaces regulations that were in the public domain;
this switch covers fields as diverse as business and immigration. Once
these shifts to private contractual modes of governance have taken
place, they render invisible the shift itself and the original
governmental regulations they replace. Theoretically speaking, they
become naturalized: lost is the fact that they were once components of
state sovereignty. The cognoscenti and those tracking these evolutions
know, but the public domain and the public conversation easily loses
track and engages what is given in the present.
Others consist of a misuse of formal instruments in order to avoid
binding law. Here I examined how states increasingly use the high seas
to stop refugees and avoid non-refoulement rules. These developments
can be conceived of as the making of new types of jurisdictions that have
variable relations to the traditional jurisdiction of the state over its
territory. They contribute to an emergent misalignment between
territory and territoriality. And this misalignment can keep growing
even if interstate borders do not change at all.
A different vector is the making of structural holes in the tissue of
national sovereign territory. Here the cases used were large-scale land
acquisitions by foreign governments and firms, and the United States'
establishment of military bases in a large number of foreign countries.
These and other such developments entail new types of borderings and
informal jurisdictions that are taking shape inside national territory.
Both sets of developments can coexist comfortably with the existing
regime of interstate borders. I argue that the excessive focus on borders
and their deregulation easily leads to an overlooking of the
transformations happening inside national sovereign territory.
The development of contractual modes that replace governmental
regulations, the making of informal jurisdictions inside sovereign
territory, and the misuse of formal jurisdictions to avoid a particular
binding law, all have an additional outcome. They can render invisible
original aims and intentions, alter the valence of existing law, and
produce novel informal systemic capabilities. The focus here was on
normatively dubious developments, including both the strengthening of
private orderings where a higher norm would be desirable, and the
states' contractualizing of practices that should remain in the public
domain and under public oversight. But in itself, some of these shifts
need not be negative, even though the focus here was on negative
instances. I rather see the possibility of multi-valence, some positive
and some not so. Thus, re-coding what were once national norms as
elements of global 'normative' orderings can enhance global capitalism,
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but it can also enhance the global commons, from human rights to the
environment. But in both instances we need to render visible these
developments and their origins.

